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INTRODUCTION: ANTITRUST GOALS AND THE RISK
OF CAPTURE
Effective competition constrains the exercise of
market power: it efficiently allocates goods and
services to consumers, rewards productive firms
that have lower costs of production and increases
incentives to invest in new technologies. These
claims are supported by a large body of evidence1.
The design of competition laws and institutions to
promote competition should consider the con-
straints that imperfect information imposes on
actual policy implementation and should explic-
itly consider the cost of failing to prevent ineffi-
cient conduct/transactions (type II errors) against
the cost of misguided intervention (type I errors),
which might reduce the incentive to compete and
thereby compromise the ultimate objective of
competition laws2. Great care is thus required in
designing competition regimes in terms, inter alia,
of the scope of their intervention, the standards
that they implement, the powers granted to them,
the procedures under which they operate and the
objectives that are assigned to them. 
While most economists agree that the ultimate
and only goal of antitrust should be to maximise
total welfare, which aggregates consumer welfare
and firms’ profits (or producers’ surplus)3, not
everyone agrees on how to achieve that goal. In
particular, many economists believe that total wel-
fare is likely to be greater when competition
authorities are instructed to intervene in order to
maximise consumer welfare. In other words, when
they are required to ignore the impact of their deci-
sions on firms’ profits (at least in a static sense
and acknowledging that incentives to further inno-
vate may have to be preserved to ensure dynamic
efficiency). These economists fear inter alia that
the adoption of a total welfare standard will lead
to enforcement in which the interests of firms are
given greater weight than the interests of con-
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sumers, in part because the firms have a greater
capability to influence decisions, while con-
sumers face collective action limitations4.
In practice, competition regimes typically con-
sider a series of competition and non-competition
goals and make no explicit reference to any wel-
fare measure. Competition laws may thus be used
to achieve political objectives other than the pro-
tection of competition. In the EU, for example,
competition law is meant to contribute to the cre-
ation of a single market. A number of jurisdictions
allow for a ‘public interest’ test, with few con-
straints on the considerations that can be
appealed to in the implementation of the test and
little guidance on the relative weight that should
be given to these considerations. 
The risk that competition provisions can be used
to pursue different goals is also increased by the
effectiveness of the remedies that they can
mobilise (including hefty fines and structural
remedies with significant effects on markets).
Accordingly, there is a temptation to use competi-
tion instruments to reinforce weaker instruments,
for example by imposing restrictions that would
alter market structure, protect certain companies,
preserve employment or otherwise affect the wel-
fare of a well-identified set of market players.
There is a number of illustrations of this from the
EU. For instance, provisions on abuse of domi-
nance have arguably been used to address the
failure to properly regulate access to essential
facilities in telecoms and energy. The cumber-
some and fragmented decision-making process
involving a multiplicity of participants (the Euro-
pean Commission, the European Parliament and
the Council of the EU representing 28 member
states) in the introduction of new regulation can
trigger calls for a more active and prompt inter-
vention by the Commission in its role of antitrust
authority, possibly imposing remedies going
beyond what is necessary to terminate an
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‘The multiplicity of objectives for competition policy, and in particular the adoption of non-
competition goals, opens the door to discretionary decisions, political intervention and more
generally the capture of enforcement decisions by particular interests .’
antitrust abuse. The public debate surrounding the
Google case and the call for drastic measures,
including break up, from various constituencies
(including the European Parliament and some
national competition authorities) is a case in point.
The multiplicity of goals and objectives, and in par-
ticular the adoption of non-competition goals,
opens the door to discretionary decisions, politi-
cal intervention and more generally the capture of
enforcement decisions by particular interests. For
example, in a world with many competing goals,
competition authorities might be more easily ‘per-
suaded’ to prioritise non-competition goals, such
as improving the competitiveness of domestic
firms, over and above the protection of effective
competition and the interests of consumers5. It
might be easier for affected parties to convince
competition authorities to adopt a decision that
favours their interests when the criteria for the
decision are fuzzy. Short of making monetary
transfers (which would be regarded as corruption
in many jurisdictions), companies involved may
raise the prospect of a revolving door and lucra-
tive positions in the future. They might simply
impress knowledge and competence that the
decision maker is unable to challenge, or more
subtly influence the priors that will affect the judg-
ments that the decision makers will have to make
(this is referred to as cognitive capture). Making
decisions inevitably involves judgments that rely
on priors, which to some extent reflect ideology.
Third parties can affect these beliefs6. Fuzzy cri-
teria might also make it easier for civil servants to
take decisions which serve their own interests.
This is known as bureaucratic capture. Civil ser-
vants in charge of an investigation will pursue their
own career goals and may accordingly bias the
investigations in order to best achieve these goals
(see Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999, for a discus-
sion7) and third parties can take advantage of this.
The risk of capture is lower when competition law
is meant to protect competition and nothing else,
and especially when competition enforcement is
guided by consumer welfare only. Hence, reforms
aimed at limiting the scope of antitrust interven-
tion to control behaviour that harms consumer
welfare are likely to reduce the risk of political
intervention and regulatory capture8.
A debate of this sort is currently being held in the
United States. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) Act provides that “unfair methods
of competition in or affecting commerce ... are
hereby declared unlawful”. The statute is framed
in general terms because any list of unfair meth-
ods of competition necessarily would be incom-
plete. FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright issued in
2013 a proposal to clarify the standards and the
limits the FTC will adhere to in exercising its
authority to prosecute unfair methods of compe-
tition under Section 59. The ultimate goal of such
proposal is to tie the hands of the FTC so that the
enforcement of Section 5 is limited to the attain-
ment of competition goals. 
Besides the multiplicity (or fuzziness) of objec-
tives, the legal standard against which the effect of
transactions or the effect of particular conduct is
assessed might allow for significant deviation
from what the protection of effective competition
would dictate. For instance, in some jurisdictions,
protecting competition does not mean protecting
consumers by preserving the integrity of the com-
petitive process, but can mean protecting com-
petitors, especially SMEs and other vulnerable
(possibly inefficient) firms. In those jurisdictions,
competition law is used to achieve non-competi-
tion goals even when those goals are not explic-
itly stated. 
This is not a concern that is limited to emerging
competition law regimes10. In a 2014 paper,
Wouter Wils, Hearing Officer of the European Com-
mission, stated: “The EU competition rules no
doubt have positive effects on consumer welfare
and on efficiency, but the EU Treaties do not allow
these effects to substituted for the objective of a
system of undistorted competition, to the exclu-
sion of the other benefits of undistorted competi-
tion... such as variety and consumer choice, the
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MOFCOM), for example, has been blamed for
imposing conditions on foreign companies
involved in M&A with the specific aim of shielding
domestic companies from the merged entities’
potential increase in competitiveness. In
Inbev/Anheuser-Bush and Wal-Mart/Niu Hai, the
parties were prohibited from entering into a spe-
cific line of business. In Novartis/Alcon, the par-
ties were required not to relaunch a Novartis
product. In Marubeni/Gavilon, the parties were
prohibited from exploiting synergies that would
reduce wholesale costs and increase Marubeni’s
competitiveness in the supply of soya beans to
the Chinese market. Synergies and efficiency
gains might allow merged companies to outper-
form Chinese competitors. China's competition
authorities appear to want to limit this negative
externality on domestic firms, rather than to
enable market conditions that will result in lower
prices and better quality products for Chinese con-
sumers15. 
More generally, Mariniello (2013) finds that all
Chinese conditional clearance decisions until
October 2013 involved foreign companies. This is
surprising. The rate of merger activity in China is
comparable to that in Europe, but the majority
(about 60 percent) of the mergers cleared with
conditions by the European Commission involve
only European companies. A potential explanation
for such an outcome is that Chinese authorities do
not enforce notification requirements against
domestic companies and, hence, relatively few
scrutinised mergers involve only Chinese compa-
nies: only 15 percent of the decisions dealt with
by MOFCOM concern domestic deals, compared to
47 percent in the case of the European Commis-
sion. It should also be pointed out that the protec-
tion of ‘the national economic development’ is one
of the factors Chinese authorities are required to
consider when performing their merger reviews
according to the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law. This
is an example of a fuzzy objective that can be
abused to favour particular interests at the
expense of competition. 
Recent examples of regulatory capture in merger
control are to be found also in economies with
established merger-control policies and where
antitrust authorities have longer experience of
enforcement. A recent consolidation wave in
right to compete on the merits, and equality of
opportunity between economic operators” (Wils,
2014; emphasis added). What amounts to a
system of undistorted competition is however ill
defined and this concept does not provide a dis-
cipline on enforcement, thereby allowing for dis-
cretionary decisions11.
Besides the multiplicity of objectives and the
scope of the legal standards, the design of the
institutions in charge of enforcement can greatly
affect the scope for capture. Even if one should be
wary of making generalisations across countries
(as the performance of an institutional design
depends on the environment in which it is inte-
grated), a number of key principles stand out.
First, capture will be easier when accountability is
limited. If authorities do not have to justify their
decisions in detail, it will be easier for them to
favour particular interests. In turn, accountability
will require some degree of transparency both
with respect to the outcomes (for instance
through detailed published decisions) and with
respect to the process12. Second, capture will be
easier when the decision maker is not independ-
ent. For instance, if the head of an agency can be
dismissed by the government without much
public justification, it will be easier for the govern-
ment to affect particular decisions13.
The debate about the effects of regulatory capture
on antitrust intervention and its implications for
competition law design has thus far been con-
ducted largely in a closed-economy setting. As we
will explain in what follows, competition law
design and enforcement issues are also relevant
in an open economy, because competition law
might be used in unorthodox ways in order to
favour domestic firms competing in global mar-
kets, at the expense of foreign competitors,
domestic consumers and economic integration.
DOMESTIC BIAS IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
The concern of a strategic use of antitrust enforce-
ment often refers to merger control14. Merger con-
trol is being used in some countries to promote
local employment and/or to favour certain popu-
lation groups, including local SMEs, at the expense
of foreign competitors. The Chinese public body in
charge of merger control (Ministry of Commerce or
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national mobile markets in Europe, for example,
has been accompanied by an extraordinary
number of public statements by political leaders
from several EU member states supporting the
adoption of a lenient approach by the European
Commission in favour of a reduction in the number
of market players16. There are good indications
that such political pressure led the Commission to
impose milder clearance conditions that it would
have otherwise. For example, the Commission was
heavily criticised by national regulators over the
Telefonica/E-Plus merger in Germany17. In that
case, the Commission identified a significant
potential harm because of the removal of an
aggressive network operator from the market, par-
ticularly for the lower-end pre-paid segment. The
Commission however cleared the merger with an
apparently weak remedy: the parties had to grant
access to less than half of the capacity that was
previously used by E-Plus to exert a competitive
constraint on Telefonica, raising doubts about the
ability of the virtual operator to replicate the com-
petitive pressure exerted by E-Plus before the
merger.
Other examples of political capture of antitrust in
Europe involve national government interventions
in cases of foreign takeovers of national champi-
ons. National concerns are often of a presumed
economic nature. There is a general perception
that a foreign investor would be less physically or
psychologically attached to the host economy,
that it would be easier for the foreign investor to
close down the headquarters of the acquired com-
pany, that the foreign investor could have an inter-
est in downgrading national brands that compete
on the same markets or that it would be less sen-
sitive to trades unions or to political pressure to
preserve jobs in the country. Such views can
become even more prevalent in times of economic
crisis. The European Union Merger Regulation
(EUMR) allows national states to derogate normal
merger control whenever specific “public inter-
ests” are endangered (Art. 21(4) EUMR). However,
the definition of public interest has not been clar-
ified and in the past governments have attempted
‘Examples of political capture of antitrust in Europe involve national government interventions in
cases of foreign takeovers of national champions. National concerns are often of a presumed
economic nature, which can become even more prevalent in times of economic crisis.’
to stretch the meaning of Art. 21(4) EUMR to pre-
empt the action of EU antitrust authorities and
impose conditions on mergers to pursue broader
goals than the protection of competition (see
Neven, 2014). Mariniello (2014) shows that in 14
out of 22 cases of major attempted cross-border
deals in the EU in the period 1999-2014 in which
the buyer’s nationality prompted government
intervention, economic concerns other than con-
sumer interests, such as fears about job cuts or
productivity losses, played a significant role in the
final outcome of the merger review. In most cases
over which economic concerns were expressed,
the merger ultimately did not take place. 
As explained by Jones and Davies (2014), where
the EUMR does not apply to a merger transaction,
“there appears to be no EU barrier to Member
States exercising regulatory approval of mergers
between domestic companies on public interest
grounds”. This has been used by some member
states, such as Germany in connection with the
E.On/Ruhrgas merger, to approve mergers that
raised clear competition concerns domestically
and internationally in order to facilitate the emer-
gence of national champions18.
Merger control might also be conditioned by for-
eign political pressure. This could be the case for
Oracle acquisition of Sun/MySQL, which was
cleared by the European Commission in January
2010. On 24 November 2009, 59 US senators
wrote to the Commission asking for the merger to
be allowed. In the letter, the senators stressed that
“Sun Microsystems’ financial position has
become more precarious and the Commission’s
inquiry has continued. Some [senators] have
raised concerns over the company’s ability to con-
tinue to employ its thousands of workers”. First
signatory Senator John F. Kerry declared: “this
transaction has been thoroughly reviewed by the
United States Department of Justice, which has
decided to take no action. Therefore, I hope the
[Commission] will quickly conclude their investi-
gation into this transaction”19.
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law to license their technologies on fair, reason-
able and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms23. This
move could be seen as an attempt to restore or
improve the competitive position of Samsung and
other Korean manufacturers such as LG, in the
wake of China’s intervention against Qualcomm.
In November 2014, the European Parliament
approved a motion calling for tougher regulation
of internet search engines, including a suggestion
that Google should be broken up as a solution to
its dominance in Europe. The resolution calls on
the European Commission “to prevent any abuse
in the marketing of interlinked services by opera-
tors of search engines” and “to consider propos-
als with the aim of unbundling search engines
from other commercial services” in the long run24.
In February 2015, US President, Barack Obama,
suggested that investigations by the European
Union into companies like Google and Facebook
were “commercially driven”. In an interview with
Recode, the president claimed that European “ser-
vice providers who... can’t compete with ours, are
essentially trying to set up some roadblocks for
our companies to operate effectively there”25. All
these political and/or strategic interventions could
distort competition at the expense of consumers,
who will be forced to pay higher prices for lower
quality products.
In our view, the problem of bias in enforcement, if
unchecked, is bound to grow in importance in a
world where economic activity is increasingly
globalised (mergers and acquisitions with a cross-
border dimension have increased about 250-350
percent since 1990), almost every country in the
world possess a competition policy toolkit (the
number of jurisdictions with competition law
enforcement has increased 600 percent since the
1990s26), and the jurisdictional reach of most
domestic antitrust laws is determined by the
‘effects doctrine’, according to which a state can
apply its antitrust laws to any anticompetitive con-
duct that has an effect on its domestic market.
EFFECTS OF CAPTURE ON TRADE AND
INVESTMENT
The types of regulatory capture in the enforce-
ment of competition law that we have illustrated
in the previous section could cause significant dis-
The strategic use of com petition policy does not
seem to be restricted to merger control. Antitrust
policy and, in particular, the laws against abusive
conduct by dominant firms might also be used
opportunistically. Companies selling key inputs,
or licensing their valuable intellectual property
(IP) to domestic manufacturers have been
accused of charging excessive prices in order to
grant domestic manufacturers a competitive
advantage over their foreign counterparts, both
domestically and in foreign markets. Some com-
panies have been forced to reduce their prices
arbitrarily; others have been compelled to license
their IP at rates that are disproportionately low. 
In August 2010, the Competition Commission of
South Africa alleged that Sasol Chemical Indus-
tries (Pty) Ltd (SCI) had contravened the South
African Competition Act by charging excessive
prices for propylene and polypropylene to its
domestic customers from 2004 to 200720. The
matter was referred to the Competition Tribunal,
which in 2014 found that SCI had charged exces-
sive prices for these products. This intervention
was justified as a way of protecting the competi-
tive position of domestic converters – companies
manufacturing different plastic products for
domestic and industrial consumption – relative to
their rivals from Brazil and South-East Asia, which
were penetrating the South African markets taking
advantage of their superior scale21.
In February 2015, US chipmaker Qualcomm paid
$975m to Chinese authorities to end a 14 month
antitrust investigation into its patent licensing
practices22. The fine is the largest in China's cor-
porate history. The settlement will require the firm
to reduce the royalty rates on its standard essen-
tial patents applied to sales of mobile phone made
in China by Chinese smartphone makers, such as
Xiaomi, Lenovo and Huawei. The move could in our
opinion help Chinese manufacturers compete
against market leaders Apple and Samsung in the
growing Chinese mobile phone market. More
recently, the Korean FTC has published revised IP
guidelines which state that it will regard as domi-
nant companies that own technologies that are
not standardised by standard-setting organisa-
tions, but that are widely used as de-facto stan-
dard technologies. By virtue of being classified as
dominant, such companies would be bound by
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ture domestic authorities. Political pressure can
be exerted by a (powerful) foreign country in order
to get a favourable treatment for investors origi-
nating in that country at the expense of domestic
consumers and (possibly) other firms. The inter-
vention in favour of domestic firms might also
involve the absence of enforcement, as in the cel-
ebrated Kodak/Fuji case, in which Japanese
authorities were accused of protecting Fuji by fail-
ing to challenge vertical restraints that acted as a
barrier against Kodak27.
More generally, with regulatory capture that
directly favours domestic firms, foreign compa-
nies face a higher risk of being convicted when
innocent (type I error), receiving a disproportion-
ate sanction (for example, the imposition of a
remedy which goes beyond what is necessary to
halt an abuse, or the imposition of conditions
unrelated to antitrust concerns such as a require-
ment to retain a certain amount of the workforce
after a merger takes place), or a greater probabil-
ity of being investigated by the antitrust author-
ity. Research points out that even an independent
arbitrator can be subject to a domestic bias. Bhat-
tacharya et al (2007), for example, show that
there is a lower probability of adverse US court
judgements for US domestic companies com-
pared to foreign companies. 
Political intervention that biases antitrust enforce-
ment in favour of local players might in particular
have effects on the competitiveness of foreign
companies that are already present in the domes-
tic market. Politically motivated antitrust inter-
vention might increase the costs of foreign firms,
which undermines their competitive position in
domestic and international markets. Countries can
also enforce their competition laws to reduce
costs for domestic firms and, therefore to improve
their competitive position in global markets. 
Biased antitrust intervention might also force for-
eign companies to revise downwards their expec-
tations about future profits from innovation. This
could reduce their incentives to invest and inno-
tributional effects, shifting rents from innovative
and efficient firms, and from local and foreign con-
sumers, to less efficient companies. This reallo-
cation of rents could distort incentives to invest
and innovate and, hence, reduce the overall
growth potential of the global economy. The risk
of domestic bias on the part of antitrust authori-
ties also creates regulatory and legal uncertainty,
thus reducing the incentives of foreign companies
to invest both domestically and overall.
Generally speaking, exports and production in
host countries, the location of future investments
and the incentive to innovate can be affected by
regulatory capture. In particular, foreign firms
might find it unattractive to produce, invest in
and/or export to countries where antitrust policy
is used strategically in order to favour their domes-
tic competitors. 
One can distinguish between four channels
through which these decisions can be affected. 
First, regulatory capture increases uncertainty:
political interference in the enforcement process
makes it more difficult to predict the final outcome
of antitrust investigations. Regardless of what that
outcome could be, the mere inability to anticipate
it reduces the incentive to invest. Julio and Yook
(2012) investigate the relationship between
cross-border capital flows and host economies’
political uncertainty. They find that the capital flow
from US companies to their foreign affiliates drops
by 12 percent during election years in host
economies. Investment is lower when investors
find it more difficult to anticipate future govern-
ment policy.
The second channel is through direct distorting
effects: these arise if the main objective of politi-
cal intervention is to protect domestic companies
(eg blocking a cross-border merger that is
expected to enhance the ability of the merged
entities to compete with domestic competitors).
The Oracle/Sun-MySQL case also illustrates that
foreign interests can sometimes attempt to cap-
‘With regulatory capture that directly favours domestic firms, foreign companies face higher
risks of being convicted when innocent, of receiving disproportionate sanctions, or a greater
probability of being investigated by the antitrust authority.’
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vate. The magnitude of these dynamic effects is
difficult to calibrate, because it depends on the
market size and industrial specialisation of the
country with a biased antitrust policy. 
A small country, or a country in which new tech-
nologies are mostly used as inputs by domestic
manufacturers, might find it optimal to adopt a pro-
implementer bias and, hence, use competition law
to reduce the cost of IP. Lower IP prices need not
have negative effects on that country’s economy
if the incentives of high-tech multinationals sup-
plying domestic manufacturers to develop new
technologies are warranted by bigger markets in
other countries. Issues pertaining to innovation
are particularly tricky for the interaction between
developed and developing countries. Over-
enforcement of antitrust could entail a transfer of
surplus from the former to the latter.
The third channel is through indirect effects if the
distortions introduced by political interference in
the enforcement of competition law affect domes-
tic markets in such a way that it is less appealing
for foreign investors to produce or invest in that
country. This could be the case if an anticompeti-
tive merger between domestic upstream compa-
nies is cleared, making downstream markets
which depend on inputs from the upstream
market where the merger took place less attrac-
tive to foreign investors. 
Finally, there are potential dynamic effects: strate-
gic trade theory suggests that the more leeway
countries have in using antitrust to pursue pro-
tectionist goals, the greater the risk that penalised
companies’ countries of origin will retaliate by
implementing equally distorting measures. The
end result is a reduction of the inflow and outflow
of trade for all jurisdictions involved28.
COMPETITION LAW IN A GLOBALISED WORLD
In the long term, sub-optimal antitrust decisions
allocating rents to domestic companies for rea-
sons other than the promotion and protection of
effective competition are likely to generate nega-
tive effects for everybody. Any short-term advan-
tages conferred on domestic firms by the strategic
use of domestic competition law will evaporate
once trading partners respond to those abuses
and retaliate. A well-functioning global economy
requires competition laws designed and enforced
without bias. And yet the world economy may find
itself, once again, in a prisoners’ dilemma situa-
tion, in which competition laws around the world
are designed and/or enforced to promote local
industry interests.
WHAT COULD BE DONE?
Policy coordination
Some of the distortions described above could be
resolved if governments converged on an under-
standing that the sole objective of competition
policy ought to be the protection of consumer wel-
fare or, in other words, if all non-competition goals
were abandoned and/or if institutions that would
protect enforcers of competition laws against cap-
ture were put in place. This would prevent the abu-
sive use of competition policy to favour certain
domestic stakeholders, such as small entrepre-
neurs, employees and domestic firms competing
in global markets, at the expense of foreign com-
petitors, consumers and economic efficiency29.
The question is how to achieve such an outcome.
In order to escape from the prisoner’s dilemma,
governments need to commit to not allow their
competition enforcement to be captured in return
for other governments making similar commit-
ments. In order to achieve this, governments
should internalise the risks for their own
economies of the generalised enforcement of
biased competition laws. International organisa-
tions, such as the International Competition Net-
work (ICN), OECD, the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development and the World Trade
Organisation, can certainly promote greater
awareness of the domestic costs of the strategic
use of competition policy. More importantly, how-
‘Governments need to commit to protect their competition enforcement against capture in return
for other governments making similar commitments. Governments should internalise the risks
for their own economies of the generalised enforcement of biased competition laws.’
09
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONANTITRUST, REGULATORY CAPTURE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
ever, the domestic firms affected by biased
enforcement abroad need to lobby their govern-
ment in order to obtain unbiased enforcement
abroad. This lobbying will balance the influence of
the domestic constituencies protected by a
biased enforcement at home and prompt the gov-
ernment to enter into a mutual commitment with
the foreign governments not to interfere with com-
petition enforcement. 
Such an exchange of market-access commit-
ments as a mechanism to achieve policy coordi-
nation has arguably worked well when the effects
of the instrument at stake are straightforward and
the implementation of the commitment is trans-
parent (for instance, with respect to commitments
to bind import tariffs below their optimal level, as
in the ‘mutual market access’ theory of the WTO
contract, see Bagwell and Staiger, 2002). But the
matter is more delicate when the implementation
is difficult to observe and when the instrument is
more complex. For instance, governments might
want to retain some discretion over the objective
of competition enforcement for legitimate public
policy reasons that are unrelated to mercantilist
motives. In many jurisdictions, including the EU,
there is considerable controversy about the adop-
tion of consumer welfare as the appropriate stan-
dard for antitrust intervention even in the absence
of international spill-overs. In addition, it will be
difficult to detect on the basis of simple indicators
whether enforcement decisions have been cap-
tured by protectionist or mercantilist motives. In
those circumstances, policy coordination will be
more difficult to achieve.
In what forum?
Soft coordination, like that achieved by the ICN or
the OECD, could help governments that are willing
to limit the opportunistic use of competition laws
to achieve some convergence in competition
policy goals or institutional design. However, it
would seem desirable to achieve a greater degree
of commitment than soft mechanisms of conver-
gence can provide. 
If one accepts that it is unrealistic in the current
circumstances to negotiate a discipline on com-
petition enforcement in the context of the WTO
(given the failure of the last attempt), bilateral free
trade agreements (FTAs) may offer some poten-
tial in this respect. 
As documented by Laprévote et al (2015), an
increasing number of FTAs include specific provi-
sions or chapters on competition-related matters.
Laprévote et al calculate that almost 90 percent
of current FTAs included in the WTO’s Regional
Database agreement contain such clauses. How-
ever, they also find that FTAs very rarely tackle the
issue of independence of enforcement of compe-
tition law by national antitrust authorities or the
goals of antitrust intervention.
A number of clauses could be considered. While
explicit coordination on competition law goals is
likely to prove overly ambitious, governments
could find it easier to coordinate their policies in
other ways. For example, a provision aimed to
ensure procedural fairness and non-discrimina-
tion in the judicial review of potentially anti-com-
petitive practices could be included in an FTA with
the explicit purpose of ensuring that misplaced
enforcement of competition law does not under-
mine the benefits of trade liberalisation. More
ambitiously, governments could agree to tie their
hands by designing their competition laws and
institutions in a way that will limit the scope for
capture. For example, they could commit to adjust
their laws so that they explicitly (a) identify the
set of non-competition goals that competition
agencies can legitimately take into consideration
(such as, for example, public and military secu-
rity, plurality of the media and prudential rules in
financial markets) and (b) specify the criteria
according to which those goals are to be assessed
and weighed. They could also commit to delegate
the assessment of non-competition goals to inde-
pendent competition authorities, thus removing
governments from the business of competition
law enforcement.  
In our view, those clauses should be adopted more
frequently. However, implementation costs would
undoubtedly depend on the level of institutional
development of the parties involved: clauses that
would in principle entail a substantial redesign of
domestic institutions might be exceptionally bur-
densome for the party required to ‘catch-up’, and
are therefore unlikely to be welcomed in the text of
an FTA (and even less likely to be implemented).
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The asymmetry in the institutional setting
between the parties to the agreement should
therefore be reflected in the choice of the right bal-
ance between clauses that aim to affect enforce-
ment directly (arguably more burdensome),
advocacy clauses promoting improvements to the
institutional framework, and clauses that promote
capacity-building initiatives and foster agency-to-
agency cooperation on antitrust matters. 
As noted by Laprévote et al, dispute-resolution
mechanisms implemented by FTAs have never so
far covered competition provisions. It would be
desirable to extend dispute-resolution mecha-
nisms to competition. It is not clear that allowing
firms to challenge governments (as in the case of
investment disputes) would be desirable,
because it involves delicate issues of discrimina-
tion between domestic and foreign firms (in favour
of the latter, because foreign firms would have
additional means to challenge a competition deci-
sion). By contrast, a state-to-state dispute-settle-
ment mechanism through which a member of the
FTA could challenge specific legal provisions and
possibly their implementation would seem more
appropriate30.
NOTES
1 See for instance, Carlton and Perloff (2005).
2 Using the terminology of decision theory, a type I error occurs when a business practice is found to be anti-
competitive when it is in fact procompetitive, and a type II error occurs when a business practice is regarded as
legitimate when in fact it is anticompetitive.
3 Farrell and Katz (2006).
4 See Neven and Röller (2005). A consumer welfare standard might also lead to a higher level of total welfare
because of a selection effect (transactions that are proposed with a consumer surplus standard might actually
yield a higher total welfare) and the commitment effect (an agency announcing a policy might not find it opti-
mal ex post to apply it given the transactions proposed by the parties). For the former, see Lyons (2002). For the
latter, see Besanko and Spulber (1993).
5 For a discussion of the difficulty in enforcing a regime with a broad (public interest) objective, see for instance
Chisholm and Jung (2014).
6 For a discussion of the role of ideology and beliefs, see Lao (2014).
7 For instance, civil servants who are supposed to evaluate all aspects of a transaction might turn into prosecu-
tors simply because the improvements in career prospects triggered by a high profile negative decision might
exceed those triggered by a clearance after a balanced in-depth investigation.
8 However, the enforcement of antitrust laws can generate distortions in the global economy even when compe-
tition enforcement is guided by consumer welfare only in all jurisdictions. See Guzman (2001). For criticisms of
this theory, see Elhauge and Geradin (2007); Trebilcock and Iacobucci (2004); McGinnis (2004) and Bradford
(2007). In addition, the effects doctrine implies that at least in the absence of country-specific remedies, the
strictest national antitrust jurisdiction will prevail in case of jurisdictional conflict, which will naturally lead to
global overregulation. See Bradford (2012).
9 Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, ‘Proposed Policy Statement Regarding Unfair Methods of Compe-
tition Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act’, 19 June 2013.
10 For a discussion in relation to the US, see Edlin and Farrell (2015).
11 In addition, some of the concepts associated with a system of undistorted competition as understood by those
rejecting a welfaristic interpretation seem to be in contradiction with effective competition. For instance, the
principle of equality of opportunity could be applied to mitigate the selective forces of the market, providing a
shelter to those operators that are unable to compete with more efficient rivals, at the ultimate expense of con-
sumers.
12 Accountability is not only a matter a transparency. It will be harder to achieve when civil servants have to per-
form potentially conflicting tasks. For instance, it is difficult to make the civil service accountable in a system in
which it investigates cases but also decides in first instance. 
13 In this regard, there is some empirical evidence supporting the view that agencies that lack independence per-
form poorly. See for instance, Borrell and Jimenez (2008), Voight (2009) and Guidi (2015). It is naturally diffi-
cult to measure to the performance of agencies, to measure their independence and to control for the other
factors that affect their performance. Results should thus be interpreted cautiously.
14 See also Bradford (2012) and Gerber (2010).
15 It should be stressed however that a full-fledged Chinese antitrust framework (the Anti-Monopoly Law) was first
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introduced in China in 2008, marking progress in limiting the likelihood of abusive conduct in Chinese markets
and arguably improving the attractiveness of the Chinese investment environment. That is to say progress has
been made but practice is still lacking in some respect. It is interesting to draw a parallel between the evolution
of the Chinese approach to competition policy and Chinese policies with effects on inward foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI). The OECD FDI restrictiveness index provides an indication of a country’s openness to foreign investors
(the index include all discriminatory measures affecting foreign investors, including market access restrictions
and departures from national treatment – it ranges from 0 to 1, with one being most restrictive; see
http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm). According to the OECD index, China became much more open
to FDI in recent years: the index for primary and tertiary sectors dropped from 0.65 – 0.75 in 1997 to below 0.5
from 2010 onwards, and for the secondary sector it dropped from above 0.4 to below 0.3. However, China still
remains much less open to FDI than the average OECD economy (below 0.10 in all sectors in 2013).
16 See, for example, ‘Merkel backs EU telco consolidation’, Financial Times, 8 May 2014.
17 See ‘Regulators revolt against Telefónica and E-Plus merger’, Financial Times, 20 June 2014.
18 The merger was initially prohibited by the Bundeskartellamt. This decision was subsequently overturned by the
Ministry of the Economy, partly because the merger would “enhance the international competitiveness” of
Ruhrgas (see http://www.eon.com/en/media/news/press-releases/2002/7/5/e-dot-on-is-granted-ministerial-
approval-for-ruhrgas-acquisition.html).
19 See ‘Hatch, Kerry Lead 59 Senators in Defending U.S. Business Abroad’, 24 November 2009, available at
http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2009/11/hatch-kerry-lead-59-senators-in-defending-u.s.-busi-
ness-abroad.
20 See Competition Commission v Sasol Chemical Industries, Case 011502, Decision, available at
http://www.comptrib.co.za/cases/complaint/retrieve_case/1722.
21 “The Tribunal concluded that SCI’s exercise of market power and its excessive prices have resulted in a missed
opportunity for innovation and development for the domestic manufacture of downstream plastic goods.
Cheaper polypropylene prices for local plastic converters could enhance local production thereby enabling them
to compete more effectively with imported final plastic products, manufacture locally rather than overseas and
introduce new products to South African consumers adding to their choice of product through greater innovation”.
See http://www.comptrib.co.za/publications/press-releases/outcome-of-the-sasol-case/. Sasol appealed the Tri-
bunal’s ruling to the Competition Appeal Court of South Africa, which overturned the Tribunal’s decision in June
2015. See http://comptrib.co.za/cases/appeal/retrieve_case/1925.
22 See ‘Qualcomm Settlement With China's NDRC Removes Major Speedbump’, Forbes, 10 February 2015, avail-
able at http://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickmoorhead/2015/02/10/qualcomm-settlement-with-chinas-ndrc-
removes-major-speedbump/.
23 Review Guidelines on Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights, 17 December 2014, available at
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=62&pageId=0401.
24 See ‘European parliament votes yes on “Google breakup” motion’, The Guardian, 27 November 2014, available
at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/27/european-parliament-votes-yes-google-breakup-
motion.
25 See ‘Obama Says Europe’s Aggressiveness Toward Google Comes From Protecting Lesser Competitors’, the
Re/code Interview, available at http://recode.net/2015/02/13/obama-says-europes-aggressiveness-towards-
google-comes-from-protecting-lesser-competitors/.
26 See Capobianco et al (2014).
27 Durling (2000). The Telmex case can be also be seen as one in which the US authorities were challenging the lack
of enforcement of the Mexican competition law (even if it was not formulated in this way). See Mavroidis and
Neven (2005).
28 See Brander and Spencer (1985). See also Gal and Padilla (2010). As pointed by Horn and Levinsohn (2001),
the strategic use of competition policy will also affect the optimal use of other instruments (in particular export
subsidies).
29 As noted above, there may be a case for the coordination of competition enforcement across jurisdictions even
if all agencies were pursuing the objective of consumers welfare and were immune to capture. This case may be
particularly compelling when trade is organised along value chains. See for instance, Antras and Staiger (2012). 
30 What we have in mind is a clause that specifies that any party that considers that any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under the FTA is being nullified or impaired as the result of the application by the other con-
tracting party of an antitrust measure may have the recourse to the dispute resolution process specified in the
FTA. This clause parallels the regulation of ‘non-violation’ complaints under Article XXIII(1)(b) of the original GATT
and Article 26 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. See Staiger and Sykes (2013).
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